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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
R.A. Glancy & Sons, Inc. ("Glancy"), a losing bidder for a 
government contract, appeals the District Court's denial of 
a request for preliminary injunctive relief. That request 
sought an order enjoining the successful bidder from 
working on the project and reinstating Glancy's putatively 
successful bid. Because Glancy did not establish that it 
was likely to succeed on the merits or that the balance of 
equities favored the issuance of a preliminary injunction, 
we affirm the District Court's decision. 
 
                                2 
  
I. 
 
On June 1, 1998, the Department of Veterans Affairs 
("VA") issued an invitation for bids ("IFB") to renovate the 
VA Medical Center in Pittsburgh. The IFB asked for bids on: 
 
       ITEM I:   GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 
       ITEM II:  ASBESTOS ABATEMENT 
       ALTERNATE NO. 1 
       ALTERNATE NO. 2 
       ALTERNATE NO. 3 
       UNIT PRICE OF MINE GROUTING 
 
(J.A. 190a). The three alternates under Item II were listed 
as minor additions to or deletions from the IFB's asbestos 
abatement requirements. (J.A. 193-94). The IFB's 
performance requirements, set forth in S 01010 of the IFB, 
elaborated on the work to be performed: 
 
       ITEM I. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION: Work includes 
       general new construction, alterations, walks, grading, 
       paving, drainage, mechanical and electrical work, 
       elevators, necessary removal of existing structures and 
       construction and certain other items. 
 
       ITEM II. ASBESTOS ABATEMENT: Work includes 
       abatement of asbestos in the area of the work as well 
       as in other selected areas, including the work 
       described in ALTERNATE 2 below. 
 
(J.A. 193). Alternate 2 requested a break-out price for 
remediating asbestos-containing floor tiles on the third floor 
of the building. The IFB form provided separate lines for 
each bid item and each alternate line; it contained no 
explicit indication that Item II was a subset of Item I. (J.A. 
188). 
 
On July 1, 1998, the VA issued a clarifying amendment 
to the IFB, which read: 
 
       Although the VA has asked for the price of the 
       Asbestos Abatement work to be listed separately (ITEM 
       II - ASBESTOS ABATEMENT under item 10 of SF 1442) 
       on the bid form, all asbestos abatement work is 
       included in a single prime contract that will be the 
       responsibility of the General Contractor. 
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(J.A. 202). 
 
The VA unsealed the bids on July 15, 1998. The VA 
determined the lowest bidder by aggregating the bids for 
Items I & II to reach a total cost for the project. Pursuant 
to this calculation, Poerio Inc. ("Poerio"), the Appellee, was 
the lowest bidder, with a bid of $11,401,500. Glancy was 
the sixth lowest bidder. 
 
Glancy and another bidder, the Massaro Company 
("Massaro"), informed the VA that they had understood the 
IFB to have required that total costs be included in Item I. 
According to that understanding, both Glancy and Massaro 
contended that the figure for Item I included the costs of 
Item II and that Item II was merely a break-out of Item I. 
(J.A. 213-14). Even under this understanding of the IFB, 
however, Glancy was the second lowest bidder after 
Massaro. 
 
Pursuant to Massaro and Glancy's protest, the VA 
examined the bidding materials, noted that the IFB did not 
contain customary language indicating that the contract 
would be awarded based on the aggregate of all bid items, 
and determined that the IFB was ambiguous. (J.A. 261-62). 
Based on this conclusion, the VA decided to open a second 
round of bidding. Massaro, the lowest bidder according to 
its interpretation of the IFB, and Poerio, the lowest bidder 
according to its interpretation of the IFB, eachfiled a 
protest with the Comptroller General under the Competition 
in Contracting Act, 31 U.S.C. SS 3551-56 (1994), 
contending that the IFB unambiguously supported their 
interpretation. The VA submitted briefing in defense of its 
position that the IFB was ambiguous and therefore should 
have been canceled. (J.A. 163-68). The VA admitted that 
the "only interpretation of the [IFB] together with [its 
specifications] at the time the solicitation was issued, was 
that each bid item was to be priced separately." (J.A. 166). 
The VA contended, however, that "the addition of the 
clarification language in Amendment No. 2 created an 
ambiguity that can be interpreted in two ways. It can be 
interpreted to require, as Poerio did, that bids be presented 
separately for general construction (Bid Item I) and for 
asbestos abatement (Bid Item II) or it can be interpreted to 
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require, as did both Massaro and Glancy, that Bid Item I 
contain the bid for all work including asbestos." (J.A. 166). 
 
While the protest was pending before the Comptroller 
General, the VA conducted a second round of bidding, and 
in this round Glancy was the lowest bidder. (J.A. 197). 
Because the protest was pending, however, the VA did not 
award the contract to Glancy. 
 
The Comptroller General ultimately sustained Poerio's 
interpretation of the IFB as the only reasonable one and 
rejected the VA's assertion that the IFB was ambiguous. 
The Comptroller General stated: 
 
       First, the cover page of the solicitation (Standard Form 
       1442) identifies two separate bid items for the 
       acquisition, "general construction" and "asbestos 
       abatement." Each of the two bid items is identified on 
       that page as a free-standing item for acquisition by the 
       agency -- specifically, there is no indication that one of 
       the two identified bid items is encompassed by the 
       other. Second, the IFB's performance requirements . . . 
       expressly define "general construction" and"asbestos 
       abatement" as distinct, separable work efforts; again, 
       each bid item description follows the separate title and 
       item number associated with each of the two separate 
       work categories. The stated item I (general 
       construction) simply does not encompass the 
       separately stated item II specialized work requirements 
       in the area of asbestos abatement. Third, the bid 
       schedule itself clearly separates the two bid items: 
       there is one space for the bidder's price for the general 
       construction work, and a separate space for the price 
       for the asbestos abatement work. Finally amendment 
       No. 2 that one prime contract would be awarded, to 
       include both the item I and item II work requirements, 
       simply does not provide any reasonable basis for a 
       bidder to conclude that its item II price should be 
       included in its item I price. 
 
(Comptroller General Op. at 4). After noting that bidders 
who perceived an ambiguity should have requested a 
clarification from the VA before submitting their bids, the 
Comptroller General concluded that the VA lacked a 
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compelling reason for cancelling the first solicitation, and 
the Comptroller General recommended that Poerio be 
granted the contract pursuant to the first solicitation. (Id. 
at 5). After receiving the Comptroller General's opinion, the 
VA informed the bidders that it was reactivating thefirst 
round of bidding, and it then awarded the contract to 
Poerio. 
 
Glancy brought this action in the District Court. Glancy 
asked the Court to declare that the VA's decision was 
arbitrary and capricious and that Glancy was the low 
bidder and was entitled to the contract. Glancy also 
requested, among other things, injunctive relief ordering the 
VA not to award the contract to any other parties. At 
Glancy's request, the District Court issued a temporary 
restraining order on February 24, 1999. (J.A. 3). The 
District Court scheduled a hearing on whether a 
preliminary injunction should issue, and this hearing was 
held before a Magistrate Judge on March 3, 1999. On 
March 5, 1999, the Magistrate Judge issued her Report and 
Recommendation, concluding that Glancy had not shown 
that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge 
to the VA's decision or that it would suffer irreparable 
injury in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief. The 
Magistrate Judge, accordingly, recommended that the 
request for a preliminary injunction be denied. The District 
Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations, 
found that granting a preliminary injunction would not be 
in the public interest because of the delays that such relief 
would cause in needed renovations to the hospital, and 
denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. This 
expedited appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court's denial of a preliminary injunction is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 
F.3d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1999). The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion, and we therefore affirm. 
 
Under 28 U.S.C. S 1491(b)(4) (1994),1 the VA's decision is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The jurisdiction of the District Court rested exclusively on 28 U.S.C. 
S 1491(b). Although Glancy's complaint involved 28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(2), 
Glancy subsequently disavowed any reliance on that provision. 
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subject to review under the standards set forth in the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1994), and 
thus Glancy could not prevail in this case without showing 
that the VA's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 
U.S.C. S 706 (1994). Applying this standard in prior 
procurement cases, we have observed that "[j]udicial 
intervention in procurement disputes necessarily results in 
delay and the expenditure of funds on behalf of all parties, 
usually without measurable benefit to the public," Sea-Land 
Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 1979), and 
we have held that discretion to award injunctive relief in 
such cases "is restricted to circumstances where the 
governmental agency's action is illegal or irrational." Coco 
Bros. v. Pierce, 741 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 
Sea-Land, 600 F.2d at 434 (only where agency action has 
"no rational basis" or upon a showing of "clear illegality" 
may federal court enjoin government procurement 
decision). 
 
Further, while irrationality or illegality is a necessary 
condition to the issuance of an injunction in the 
government procurement context, "[e]ven when that 
showing has been made, prudent judicial discretion may 
still refuse declaratory or injunctive relief because of 
overriding public interests." Sea-Land, 600 F.2d at 434; see 
also Coco, 741 F.2d at 680; Princeton Combustion Research 
Lab., Inc. v. McCarthy, 674 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (3d Cir. 
1982); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Friedkin, 635 F.2d 248, 253 
(3d Cir. 1980). Thus, in determining whether injunctive 
relief is proper, a court must also weigh "the practical 
considerations of efficient government operation; the public 
interest in avoiding excessive costs; and the bidders' 
entitlement to fair treatment through agency adherence to 
statutes and regulations." Sea-Land, 600 F.2d at 434. 
 
Finally, where as here the Comptroller General has made 
a recommendation that the procuring officer follows, that 
recommendation must be taken into account in reviewing 
the Executive's decision. In the Competition in Contracting 
Act ("CICA"), 31 U.S.C. SS 3551-56 (1994), Congress 
strengthened the Comptroller General's role in the 
government procurement process. Honeywell, Inc. v. United 
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States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989). We have noted 
that while the CICA does not "compel procuring agencies to 
obey the recommendation of the Comptroller General,"2 its 
effect "is to compel procurement officials to make purchase 
decisions in light of what the Comptroller General 
recommends the government do in that case." Ameron v. 
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 986 (3d 
Cir. 1986); see Honeywell, 870 F.2d at 648 (in light of 
CICA, "a procurement agency's decision to follow the 
Comptroller General's recommendation, even though that 
recommendation differed from the contracting officer's 
initial decision, [is] proper unless the Comptroller General's 
decision itself was irrational"). 
 
Applying these standards,3 we can discern no abuse of 
discretion in the District Court's determination that Glancy 
is unlikely to succeed on the merits. The GAO first noted 
that, under applicable law, only a compelling reason will 
justify reopening a closed bidding process. (Comptroller 
General's Op. at 3). The reason for this is to discourage 
"auction type" bidding at which a disappointed bidder, 
armed with knowledge of the prior bids, artificially lowers 
its bid in order to win the contract. Chemung County v. 
Dole, 781 F.2d 963, 972 (2d Cir. 1986). While an ambiguity 
in a bid solicitation can be a sufficiently compelling reason 
to reopen the bidding process, the Comptroller General 
concluded in this case that the IFB was not "susceptible to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d 
Cir. 1986), the government argued unsuccessfully that the CICA is 
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the Comptroller General to 
shorten or lengthen the stay of the execution of a contract that 
automatically occurs when a bid protest is filed with the Comptroller 
General. However, the government did not challenge the Comptroller 
General's authority to investigate procurement decisions or to make 
recommendations on the basis of his investigation. See 809 F.2d at 988. 
 
3. Glancy's attempt to distinguish Sea-Land , Princeton Combustion and 
Coco is unavailing. Glancy argues that these cases do not apply because 
they did not involve sealed bids (as here) or did not involve a situation 
where the procuring agency reversed itself on the basis of the GAO's 
recommendation. These are distinctions without significance in this 
context. In any event, Glancy does not even attempt to distinguish 
Honeywell, a case squarely on point, and that clearly supports the 
deferential standard of judicial review the District Court employed. 
 
                                8 
  
more than one reasonable interpretation when read in the 
context of the solicitation as a whole." (Comptroller General 
Op. at 3) (emphasis added). This decision is rational for the 
reasons identified by the Comptroller General-- the IFB 
contained two separate items upon which bidders were to 
submit bids, separate lines were provided for the bids on 
these items, and the clarifying amendment's admonition 
that one prime contract would be awarded was not a 
reasonable basis upon which to base a conclusion that Item 
II was a break-out of Item I. Mindful that courts are not to 
substitute their judgment for that of the Executive, we 
agree with the District Court's assessment of the merits 
and with its conclusion that preliminary injunctive relief 
was inappropriate. 
 
The District Court's alternate basis for denying relief -- 
that the delays associated with bringing in a new general 
contractor if preliminary injunctive relief were granted 
would not be in the public interest because it would further 
delay the renovation of a vital liver transplant center -- is 
based on factual findings amply supported by the record. 
(Supp. Findings of Fact P 2 et seq.). We agree with the 
District Court that the equities here do not lie with Glancy, 
especially in light of the fact that even under its 
understanding of the first solicitation, Glancy was not the 
low bidder. (See Gov't Br. at 40-41 ("Glancy's claimed 
interest in fair procurement procedures rings hollow. 
Glancy was not the low bidder in the initial round of 
bidding even under its own reading of the original 
solicitation.").) 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's March 10, 
1999, Order denying Glancy's motion for preliminary 
injunctive relief. 
 
A True Copy: 
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